 The USS Truxtun |
In October 1972, while on her fourth WESTPAC deployment, USS TRUXTUN reassumed duties as PIRAZ in the Gulf of Tonkin. Operating off the coast of North Vietnam, TRUXTUN was credited with directing fighter intercepts which resulted in the destruction of eleven North Vietnames MIG jets and rescue of three downed American pilots, earning the ship her second Navy Unit Commendation.
TRUXTUN served primarily as PIRAZ (Positive Identification Radar Advisory Zone) for Task Force 77 in the Gulf of Tonkin. TRUXTUN was assigned to ensure safety and flight tracking services for U.S. strike aircraft as well as maintain constant radar surveillance of the area providing air defense against enemy aircraft during LINEBACKER II operations.
Operation LINEBACKER II began on December 18, 1972, 3,000 sorties, 11 days, and 40,000 tons of bombs penetrated the most concentrated air defense of the war. President Richard Nixon had turned complete control of the Vietnam war over to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas Moorer on December 14, 1972 with orders "to win this war". As a result of this order Operation LINEBACKER II was executed. Eleven days after the B-52's began this operation, America's involvment in Vietnam was over. Peace talks that had came to a stalemate in October 1972 were resumed on January 8, 1973. Within 30 days after the final bomb was dropped Le Duc Tho and Henry Kissinger reached a final agreement and signed the Paris Peace Accords on January 27, 1973.
December 20, 1972 will be remembered as the day that the United States lost the most B-52 aircraft to hosile fire while performing a combat operation. Four B-52Gs were shot down, two B-52Ds and another receiving severe damage. Two hundred and twenty-one Soviet SA-2 missiles had been fired at the attacking B-52 formation on that evening. Several patterns had developed by the end of the third night of Operation LINEBACKER II. One, Six B-52s had been shot down while in a high angle banked post-target turn. Two, five of the seven B-52Gs that had been shot down were un-modified B-52Gs. Because of these factors and the high B-52 losses that occured on December 20, 1972 SAC planners had to alter their plans if the B-52s valued at $8.0 million each were to continue their raids into the Hanoi area.
The United States paid a price for the accomplishments of Linebacker II. During bombing raids, U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy aircraft encountered intense enemy defensive actions that resulted in the loss of twenty-six aircraft in the twelve-day period. Air Force losses included fifteen B-52s, two F-4s, two F-111s, and one HH-53 search and rescue helicopter. Navy losses included two A-7s, two A-6s, one RA-5, and one F-4. Seventeen of these losses were attributed to SA-2 missiles, three to daytime MiG attacks, three to antiaircraft artillery, and three to unknown causes.
The crew of TRUXTUN worked in a Condition Three wartime footing with one third of the ships crew awake and at battle stations all the time.
The 5 inch 54 caliber gun and its MK 68 Gun Fire Control System were loaded and manned on the bow. Back aft, one of the big, megawatt, AN/SPG-55 Missile Fire Control Radars was on stand by and the twin-arm missile launcher had birds on the rail. The scope dope surface tracker, using the ancient AN/SPS-10 surface search radar, watched for contacts out to about 30 miles. The AN/SPS 48 air search radar was continually turning at the masthead, probing deep into the enemy defenses, revealing any aircraft that was up over the capital of Hanoi, and the port of Haiphong.
The Tactical Action Officer, in CIC, watched and reacted as the raids went in. He had authority to fire the weapons. We were poised to respond to any air, surface, and subsurface attack within seconds.
A full bridge team of OOD, JOOD, quartermaster, and Boatswains Mate of the watch with his helmsmen and lookouts conned the ship safely around in it's appointed station. The watch officers had complete freedom of movement within the PIRAZ/ North SAR station, just five miles off Haiphong harbor.
It was during this time frame that the night watch section of the Truxtun had an uncanny experience. The Boatswains mate of the watch was me, T.C. Rogers. At the time I was a third class petty officer (E-4) and running the deck watch section. This included all the lookouts, and the men steering and manuvering the vessel. Though these men were under the orders of the Officer of the deck,(OOD) and the Junior officer of the deck, (JOOD) I was responsible for their direct supervision in their performance of their duties.
The time was before 0100, and we had not been on watch for long.
The men had spent time before watch in near black out conditions gaining their night vision. This adjustment takes about fifteen minutes, and the eyesight continues to become better as time goes on. At sea the night is absolutely dark, there are no lights from the ship, which was running in blackout conditions, with all light lockers rigged. These are flat black painted baffles that act as a maze, rigged on every hatch that lets onto the deck. This prevents even the subdued lighting from the interior of the ship leaking past them to be seen. To be seen is to become a target. Walking on the deck in pitch black conditions can be a life threatening situation at worst, and painful when you strike a deck mounted cleat or some other machinery. Some deck fixtures are painted white, which makes them dimly visible at a range of two or three feet under these conditions.
No one knows exactly what happened. The facts are these:the operator of the AN/SPS 10 radar reported that he had a surface contact that was intermittent. The range was 10 miles and course and speed indicated that it was headed for the Truxtun. Moments later, the operator of the AN/SPS 48 radar also confirmed the contact but he said that the contact was airborne. Some confusion was generated by these conflicting reports. The speed reported by the 10 radar operator was 20 knots, consistent with a torpedo boat, which the North Vietnamese were known to have.
However the 48 radar operator reported a much higher speed, consistent with that of an aircraft. There was much discussion, and additional radars were brought to bear, as the contact continued to close on our position. All lookouts were ordered to scan the bearing upon which the closing contact was comming. The T.A.O pointed the 5 inch gun on the bearing of the contact, ready to fire.
The contact became invisible to the 10 radar, it just disappeared off the scope, but the 48 radar continued to report the contact closing at 100 knots. Fire control radars intermittantly saw then lost the contact. They were unable to get a lock. The men on watch were tense, torpedo boats had attacked U.S. vessels in these waters in the past, the U.S.S. Long Beach had been chased all over the Gulf of Tonkin just a couple of years before.
None of the lookouts was able to report a visible contact, but the radar operator of the air search set continued to report a closing bogie. According to the radar, the contact passed right through the hull of the Truxtun, then continued right out the other side and maintained the same course and speed until it simply vanished. No one on the deck saw anything.
The OOD and JOOD held a whispered conference in the corner of the pilot house, out of ear shot of the rest of the bridge crew.
After their conference was over I approached the OOD, and asked what entry I should make in the Boatswains Mate's deck log, this is the log that records all official incidents which take place during the day and night watch. He told me to make no entry.That nothing had happened.
This is understandable, no junior officer wants his name associated with some sort of flakey entry in the ships log.
There was no official record of what happened that night in the Gulf of Tonkin. The men who were on deck and in the Combat Information Center were there and know that some unexplainable phenomena occurred. One wonders how many other similar things occur every day, and never get reported.